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IMPROVING AGENCIES’ PREEMPTION 
EXPERTISE WITH CHEVMORE CODIFICATION 
Kent Barnett* 
INTRODUCTION 
After nearly thirty years, the judicially crafted Chevron1 and Skidmore2 
judicial-review doctrines have found new life as exotic, yet familiar, 
legislative tools.  When Chevron deference applies, courts employ two 
steps:  they consider whether the statutory provision at issue is ambiguous, 
and, if so, they defer to an administering agency‘s reasonable 
interpretation.3  Skidmore deference, in contrast, is a less deferential regime 
in which courts assume interpretative primacy over statutory ambiguities 
but defer to agency action based on four factors—the agency‘s 
thoroughness, reasoning, consistency, and overall persuasiveness.4  In the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,5 Congress 
directed courts to review the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency‘s 
(OCC) decisions to preempt state law under Skidmore‘s four criteria.6  It 
also provided a savings clause that permitted Chevron deference for other 
OCC determinations.7  This was the first time that Congress codified either 
Skidmore or Chevron.  By doing so, Congress itself used the judicially 
choreographed Chevron two-step and Skidmore quadrille—to which I refer 
collectively as Chevmore8—to inform ongoing debates in administrative 
law.9 
 
*  Assistant Professor, University of Georgia School of Law.  I appreciate helpful comments 
from Mehrsa Baradaran, Bo Rutledge, Catherine Sharkey, Chris Walker, Art Wilmarth, and 
the participants at the University of Georgia School of Law‘s junior faculty workshop.  I also 
very much appreciate suggestions from the symposium participants in Chevron at 30:  
Looking Back and Looking Forward at Fordham University School of Law on March 7, 
2014. 
 
 1. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 2. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 3. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
 4. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
 5. Pub. L. No. 11-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42 U.S.C.). 
 6. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 7. 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(B) (2012). 
 8. I use the portmanteau Chevmore to distinguish these two judicially crafted judicial-
review doctrines from other judicial-review standards, such as those in the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
 9. In a forthcoming article, Codifying Chevmore, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2015), I consider the broader implications of, and other uses for, Chevmore codification. 
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In this Essay for the Fordham Law Review symposium Chevron at 30:  
Looking Back and Looking Forward, I focus on one way in which 
Chevmore codification can improve administrative law:  encouraging 
agencies to improve their expertise in preempting state law (or ―agency 
preemption‖).10  To do so, I present a case study of Congress‘s response to 
the OCC‘s controversial preemption of state consumer-protection law.  I 
begin in Part I by focusing on administrative expertise‘s role in Chevmore 
deference generally11 and in agency preemption specifically.12  With 
expertise‘s doctrinal and normative place in mind, I explain in Part II.A 
that, because of the OCC‘s conflicts of interest and purported status as a 
―captured‖ agency, the agency‘s broad preemption rulings were most likely 
not the product of agency expertise.  I continue in Part II.B to argue that, 
with Dodd-Frank‘s substantive and procedural preemption provisions 
(including its codified Skidmore provision), Congress did more than 
establish its disapproval of the OCC‘s broad preemption rulings.  Instead, it 
confronted the conflict and capture concerns by encouraging the OCC to 
develop and use its preemption expertise.  It did so by codifying the 
appropriate preemption standard, establishing various procedural 
requirements for the OCC to support its decisions with data, and limiting 
judicial deference (through Skidmore codification) to the OCC‘s 
preemption decisions. 
Despite Congress‘s largely successful attempt to encourage agency 
expertise, I briefly conclude in Part II.C by considering how Congress can 
further improve agencies‘ expertise as to preemption specifically and other 
matters generally.  Congress can lead agencies to consider how their 
technical and administrative expertise interacts with federalism values by 
requiring the agencies to consider those values and consult with affected 
parties.  Congress can also use Chevmore codification to improve agencies‘ 
use of technical and administrative expertise both in and outside of the 
preemption context by allowing agencies to exchange Skidmore deference 
for Chevron deference when they develop and apply their expertise to 
certain matters. 
I.   ADMINISTRATIVE EXPERTISE IN JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Before discussing the OCC‘s preemption history and Skidmore‘s 
codification, this Essay considers how expertise does and should inform 
judicial review generally and agency preemption specifically. 
 
 10. For an overview of the symposium, see Peter M. Shane & Christopher J. Walker, 
Foreword:  Chevron at 30:  Looking Back and Looking Forward, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 475 
(2014). 
 11. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 
ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 368 (1986); Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 
1271, 1310–11 (2008); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?:  Implied Delegations, 
Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 737 
(2002). 
 12. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737 
(2004). 
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A.   Expertise and Chevmore 
Expertise is and should be a necessary criterion for all judicial deference 
to agency action, including for Chevron deference.  From a descriptive 
standpoint, expertise matters under current doctrine.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court, although often focusing on several values in determining whether to 
defer to agency action,13 consistently invokes agency expertise as a guiding 
value.  Skidmore deference, for instance, is grounded primarily on expertise, 
while Chevron deference relies upon expertise to inform whether Congress 
intended an agency to receive interpretive primacy.  And from a normative 
perspective, expertise should inform judicial review because it justifies the 
administrative state. 
Skidmore deference (or the lack thereof) focuses on administrative 
expertise.  In Skidmore, the Court reviewed whether certain employees were 
entitled to overtime pay and related damages under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act14 (FLSA).15  The Labor Department had provided its 
interpretation of the statute that required a ―flexible‖ analysis to determine 
when overtime was due.16  The Court held that an agency‘s interpretation is 
entitled to deference, even if not controlling on the courts, if it represents a 
―body of experience and informed judgment.‖17  Deference depends upon 
the agency‘s use of expertise, as evidenced by ―the thoroughness evident in 
its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier 
and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 
persuade.‖18  Indeed, the Court in United States v. Mead19 held that the 
music for a Skidmore quadrille begins when ―the regulatory scheme is 
highly detailed . . . [and the agency] can bring the benefit of specialized 
experience to bear.‖20  In short, as leading scholars have noted, the 
existence and use of agency expertise are central to Skidmore deference.21 
Expertise is likewise germane to Chevron deference, even if it only 
informs whether Congress wants an agency to assume interpretive primacy 
over ambiguous statutory provisions that the agency administers.  The 
Court in Chevron relied primarily upon a delegation theory—namely, that 
 
 13. See generally Criddle, supra note 11. 
 14. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012). 
 15. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 135–36 (1944). 
 16. Id. at 138. 
 17. Id. at 140. 
 18. Id. 
 19. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 20. Id. at 235. 
 21. See A.T. Massey Coal Co. v. Holland, 472 F.3d 148, 169 (4th Cir. 2006) (denying an 
agency Skidmore deference because the agency had ―developed virtually no experience that 
might be considered a ‗body of experience and informed judgment‘‖ (quoting Skidmore, 323 
U.S. at 140)); Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern 
Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1293 (2007) (noting ―comparative agency 
expertise and the potential for arbitrariness in the exercise of that expertise‖ are central to 
Skidmore); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 
855 (2001) (―Under Skidmore, however, it does not matter whether Congress has delegated 
authority to an agency to administer the statute as long as the agency has relevant 
expertise.‖). 
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Congress delegated power to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
to create binding interpretations of ambiguous statutory terms—in deferring 
to the EPA‘s interpretation of an ambiguous term within the Clean Air 
Act.22  Determining whether Congress delegated authority to the agency 
requires courts to consider congressional intent.23  The Chevron Court 
concluded that Congress could reasonably think that agencies with their 
―great expertise‖ are in a better position to fill statutory gaps than courts.24  
Expertise, accordingly, informed whether Congress intended to delegate 
interpretive primacy to an agency.25 
Almost two decades later, the Court in United States v. Mead suggested 
that expertise was not germane to Chevron deference.26  There, the Court 
determined that Chevron should not apply to certain Customs Service ruling 
letters because Congress had not intended to delegate interpretive primacy 
to the agency when it exercised its authority through informal means that 
lacked the force of law.27  In focusing on the formality of the agency action, 
the Court stated that ―generally . . . Congress contemplates administrative 
action with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal 
administrative procedure,‖ and pointed to notice-and-comment rulemaking 
and formal adjudication as generally sufficient.28  The Court relegated its 
discussion of expertise to its consideration of Skidmore deference.29 
Notwithstanding Mead‘s suggestion that expertise was irrelevant to 
Chevron deference,30 Professor Evan Criddle contends that the Court has 
continued to consider expertise after Mead.31  For instance, the Court relied 
upon the Attorney General‘s lack of expertise in medical ethics when 
refusing to grant him Chevron deference for an interpretive rule concerning 
euthanasia.32  The official‘s lack of relevant expertise undermined the 
argument that Congress had delegated lawmaking power to him.33  
 
 22. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–45 
(1984); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2012). 
 23. See Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2637, 2646 (2003). 
 24. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
 25. Id. at 865–66; John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 
TEX. L. REV. 113, 191 (1998) (―[T]he Court ultimately supported its deference principle [in 
Chevron] with two intertwined policy reasons—agency expertise and democratic 
accountability . . . .‖). 
 26. United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 27. See id. at 231–33; see also Criddle, supra note 11, at 1274 (―[T]he Supreme 
Court . . . expressly ground[ed] Chevron in the congressional delegation theory.‖). 
 28. Mead, 533 U.S. at 230–31. 
 29. Id. at 234–35. 
 30. See Criddle, supra note 11, at 1301–02 (discussing Mead‘s impact on ―consensus 
view‖); Garrett, supra note 23, at 2637 (referring to delegation theory as ―consensus view‖ 
of Chevron). 
 31. See generally Criddle, supra note 11. But see Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating 
Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2137 (2002) (―Chevron deference does 
not depend on any showing of agency expertise . . . .‖). 
 32. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 266–67 (2006). 
 33. Moreover, the Gonzales Court refused to defer to the Attorney General‘s 
interpretation of a regulation per Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). See Gonzales, 546 
U.S. at 256–57.  The regulation merely parroted the statutory language, ―instead of using 
[the official or agency‘s] expertise and experience to formulate a regulation.‖ Id. at 257.  The 
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Conversely, in awarding Chevron deference to the Labor Department in 
Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke,34 the Court relied upon the 
agency‘s expertise in deciding that Congress had delegated lawmaking 
authority to the Department to interpret the FLSA‘s overtime and 
minimum-wage provisions.35  Indeed, after their comprehensive empirical 
study of the Supreme Court‘s use of deference doctrines since Chevron, 
William Eskridge and Lauren Baer concluded that the application of 
specialized agency expertise may be the ―most significant variable‖ in 
influencing whether the Supreme Court defers to agency action.36 
Considering expertise for both Skidmore and Chevron makes sense.  
Agencies‘ raison d’être is to provide a font of expertise to advise Congress 
and to administer a complex and often technical statutory scheme in an 
ever-growing federal bureaucracy.37  Agency expertise can take different 
(yet overlapping) forms.  Agencies may develop ―administrative expertise‖ 
by having repeated experience with regulated and benefited parties in 
administering a statutory scheme and regularly confronting (and learning 
from) new issues that arise.38  They can also have ―technical expertise‖ 
concerning the jargon and nature of the particular regulated industry, 
including the scientific or economic considerations that inform and impact 
how a regulated industry operates.39  Agencies, too, may acquire 
 
Court‘s reliance on expertise is meaningful for both Auer and Chevron deference—despite 
the former doctrine‘s concern with deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous 
regulations, as opposed to statutes—because ―[i]n practice, Auer deference is Chevron 
deference applied to regulations rather than statutes.‖ Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. 
Ct. 1326, 1339 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting in part). 
 34. 551 U.S. 158, 165, 167–68 (2007). 
 35. Id. at 165; see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of 
Congressional Delegation, 97 VA. L. REV. 2009, 2015–18 (2011) (noting that the Court in 
Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144 (1991), considered the comparative expertise of two 
agencies in deciding to which agency Congress delegated interpretive authority for agency 
regulations); Garrett, supra note 23, at 2649 (arguing expertise should be germane to 
delegation). 
 36. William N. Eskridge & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:  Supreme 
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 
1083, 1180 (2008); see also Ronald M. Levin, Scope-of-Review Doctrine Restated:  An 
Administrative Law Section Report, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 239, 270 (1986) (noting that 
expertise is a ―significant variable‖ in determining judicial deference). 
 37. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency 
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 681 (1996) (―Congress‘s decision 
to commit lawmaking power to agencies vests substantial regulatory authority in specialized 
bodies with knowledge, expertise, and experience that generalist courts lack.  Agencies may 
therefore have insights into regulatory history, context, or purpose that may not be readily 
apparent to even the most seasoned federal judge.‖); Jonathan R. Siegel, The REINS Act and 
the Struggle to Control Agency Rulemaking, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL‘Y 131, 174 
(2013) (―[O]ne need only recall the reasons why Congress creates administrative 
agencies . . . in the first place:  Congress lacks the time and expertise to make every decision 
itself . . . .‖). 
 38. See Breyer, supra note 11, at 368 (―At a minimum, the agency staff understands the 
sorts of interpretations needed to ‗make the statute work.‘‖); Criddle, supra note 11, at 
1286–87. 
 39. See Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial 
Review As Transaction of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 756 (2011); Edward L. 
Rubin, Uniformity, Regulation, and the Federalization of State Law:  Some Lessons from the 
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―legislative expertise‖—i.e., insight into legislative history and 
congressional intent—because they often have a hand in advising Congress 
in drafting and revising legislation.40  Expertise, as central to agencies‘ very 
existence, rightly influences judicial deference and the nature or extent of 
congressional delegation.41 
To be sure, expertise should not assume talismanic dimension, where its 
invocation provides agencies carte blanche.  Even when technical in nature, 
expertise is not always an objective matter.42  Agency decisions, 
masquerading as expertise,43 can arise from political considerations,44 
faulty assumptions, or improper biases.45  These failings will likely never 
be cured because of human nature, changing agency incentives, and the 
varied matters that agencies must decide. 
That said, expertise‘s perceived failings may be exaggerated by turning 
expertise into something that it is not.  In any of its forms, expertise may 
not always be scientific, quantitative, or objective.46  Instead, like lawyerly 
expertise, agency expertise includes the acquisition of considered (and often 
subjective) judgment, i.e., the ability to predict likely outcomes, recognize 
relevant issues and uncertainties, and reach sensible conclusions based often 
 
Payment System, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1251, 1267 (1989) (noting that merely speaking the 
language of industry is a key form of administrative expertise). 
 40. Breyer, supra note 11, at 368; accord Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 485 (1981) 
(―[T]he Bureau [of Prisons]‘s interpretation of the statute merits greater than normal weight 
because it was the Bureau that drafted the legislation and steered it through Congress with 
little debate.‖); Eskridge & Baer, supra note 36, at 1173. 
 41. These forms of agency expertise have long informed another judicial-review 
standard:  whether agency action is ―arbitrary or capricious‖ under the APA, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706(2)(A) (2012). See Bressman, supra note 35, at 2042–43 (noting that political scientists 
have argued that agency expertise influences congressional delegation); Krotoszynski, supra 
note 11, at 755. 
 42. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in 
the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 524 (1989) (―We have gradually become 
disillusioned with the idea that regulatory policy dilemmas have an objectively ‗correct‘ 
answer, discernible through the aggregation of enough information and the application of 
enough expertise.‖). 
 43. See Emily Hammond Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and the Deference 
Dilemma, 61 DUKE L.J. 1763, 1809 (2012) (―[S]cholars have demonstrated that agencies 
sometimes cloak policy judgments in a shroud of science to avoid accountability and achieve 
more deferential judicial review.‖). 
 44. See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious 
Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 18–19 (2009) (referring to political considerations in agency 
decision making). 
 45. See Kent Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, 66 VAND. L. REV. 797, 816–27 
(2013) (discussing due process and bias concerns surrounding federal administrative law 
judges); Eskridge & Baer, supra note 36, at 1173 (noting perception of agency bias affects 
agency‘s institutional advantage).  Indeed, one study concerning the FTC‘s antitrust 
decisions suggests that agencies may not have more expertise than generalist federal courts. 
See generally Joshua D. Wright & Angela M. Diveley, Do Expert Agencies Outperform 
Generalist Judges?  Some Preliminary Evidence from the Federal Trade Commission, 
1 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 82 (2013). 
 46. See Greater Bos. Tel. Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (―[A]gency 
matters typically involve a kind of expertise—sometimes technical in a scientific sense, 
sometimes more a matter of specialization in kinds of regulatory programs.‖). 
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on repeated confrontations with particular scenarios.47  This judgment—
developed, among other ways, through repeated litigation, solicitation of 
public comment, pilot studies, modification of prior rules,48 and at times an 
―administration‘s views of wise policy‖49—can and often should inform 
agency action. 
Moreover, limiting the proper scope of agency expertise can largely 
mitigate expertise‘s shortcomings.  Congress or courts can define 
substantive considerations to cabin the agency‘s discretion and harness the 
agency‘s judgment that arises from experience and knowledge, especially 
when an equation or experiment fails to provide a definitive answer.  
Congress can also provide procedural requirements—such as Mead‘s 
reliance upon formalized administrative action—to improve agencies‘ 
exercise of their judgment.  When these required procedures allow public 
participation (and, in turn, administrative responsiveness to interested 
parties‘ concerns), they help inform agencies and assist courts and agencies 
in ferreting out decision making that relies on something other than 
permissible considerations and agency expertise.50  By doing so, 
substantive and procedural limitations provide Congress, as principal, ways 
of controlling its agency costs without sacrificing the benefits of 
administrative expertise.51 
 
 47. See Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen, Blank Checks:  Restoring the Balance of Powers 
in the Post-Chevron Era, 32 B.C. L. REV. 757, 774–75 (1991) (―[E]xpertise is reflected 
primarily in the assessment of the likely outcomes of policy alternatives.‖); Eskridge & Baer, 
supra note 36, at 1174 (recognizing that applying a statute to new circumstances creates 
uncertainties that agencies are usually ―much better equipped to handle‖ than courts); Sidney 
Shapiro et al., The Enlightenment of Administrative Law:  Looking Inside the Agency for 
Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463, 470 (2012) (recognizing the deliberative-
constructive paradigm of administrative law holds that ―experts are not limited to persons 
trained in scientific methodologies but include other professionals, particularly lawyers and 
public administrators, who rely on qualitative analysis to identify and justify regulatory 
solutions‖). 
 48. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 36, at 1174. 
 49. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 
(1984); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures As Politics in Administrative Law, 107 
COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1765 (2007) (―[Chevron] recognized that politics is a permissible 
basis for agency policymaking.‖); Watts, supra note 44, at 8. 
 50. See Krotoszynski, supra note 11, at 752–53 (noting how public-participation 
requirements encourage the use of agency expertise and better ensure that decisions are not 
arbitrary); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 
41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1444 (1992) (―[A] reasoned explanation ensures that the range of agency 
action is . . . supportable by facts in the record, reasonable assumptions, and sound policy 
considerations . . . .‖). 
 51. See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 
125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1187 (2012) (―[W]henever Congress delegates authority to an 
agency, the delegation . . . creates a risk of drift away from the preferences of the 
[delegating] lawmakers . . . .‖).  Because political accountability and public-participation 
values can improve agency decision making, values aside from expertise should also be 
relevant to Chevron deference. See Criddle, supra note 11, at 1284–91; see also Peter L. 
Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year:  Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s 
Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1112 
(1987) (considering the values of national uniformity that Chevron furthers). 
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B.   Expertise in Agency Preemption 
Agency expertise should also inform the narrower issue of judicial 
deference to agency preemption.  Without significant discussion, courts 
have applied both Chevron and Skidmore when reviewing agency-
preemption decisions.52  Prior to Dodd-Frank, Professor Nina Mendelson 
persuasively contended that Skidmore should apply53 to agency preemption 
because agencies lack expertise in federalism matters.54  Agencies, with 
their technical and administrative expertise, can usually determine how state 
laws affect statutory schemes that they administer.55  And they may often 
use their delegated rulemaking power that has the force of law.  But, aside 
from lacking clear guidance from Congress as to when they should 
preempt,56 agencies often fail to consider political and abstract federalism 
values, such as those that seek to protect a state‘s dignity interest or its 
ability to serve as a policy ―laboratory.‖57  Agencies‘ failure to do so may 
not be surprising because they are unlikely to confront these values 
routinely.  Yet, even when they could have considered federalism values, 
they often have ignored all or some of the nine federalism values that 
Federalism Executive Order 13,132 required or advised them to consider.58  
Applying Skidmore deference to agency preemption recognizes agencies‘ 
technical and administrative expertise while accounting for their lack of 
experience in weighing federalism values in their preemption analysis.59 
Agencies can, however, improve their preemption expertise.  Professor 
Catherine Sharkey has proposed an ―agency-reference model‖ that calls for 
agencies (and courts during judicial review) to focus on what agencies do 
best:  use their expertise in collecting and analyzing information, 
particularly as it relates to cost-benefit analysis, concerning preemption.60  
In later work, she surveyed federal agencies (including the OCC) to 
recommend improvements that agencies can make in their agency-
 
 52. Compare Wachovia Bank v. Watters, 431 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 2005) (applying the 
Chevron framework to the OCC‘s preemption decision (citing Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. 
Boutris, 419 F.3d 949, 958 (9th Cir. 2005), and Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 
305, 315 (2d Cir. 2005))), with Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 576–77 (2009) (applying 
Skidmore deference to agency‘s preemption decision). See also Cuomo v. Clearing House 
Ass‘n, L.L.C., 557 U.S. 519, 525 (2009) (applying the Chevron framework to the OCC‘s 
preemption of state visitorial powers, but not deferring). 
 53. See generally Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 
NW. U. L. REV. 695 (2008); Mendelson, supra note 12. 
 54. Mendelson, supra note 12, at 779. 
 55. See id. at 779–80. 
 56. See Mendelson, supra note 53, at 721–22. 
 57. See Mendelson, supra note 12, at 781–82. 
 58. See id. at 784–86; see also Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (1999).  Those 
values include using preemption only for issues of truly national scope, considering the 
states‘ and the people‘s rights to determine the ―moral, political, and legal character of their 
lives,‖ treating the states as policy laboratories, and acting with ―the greatest caution‖ when 
federal action affects states‘ or localities‘ policymaking discretion. See id. § 2(a)–(i). 
 59. See Mendelson, supra note 12, at 797. 
 60. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability:  “Agency-Forcing” 
Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125, 2153 (2009). 
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preemption determinations.61  For instance, she suggests that agencies 
develop internal guidelines to determine when rulemakings implicate 
federalism concerns and to use empirical evidence to show that state law 
impedes federal objectives.62  To permit a more robust federalism debate, 
she also recommends better agency consultation with state representatives 
by having agencies contact more interested groups and notify state 
attorneys general about agency-preemption actions.63  By encouraging 
reliance on empirical evidence and engagement with state governments, her 
recommendations encourage agencies to use and develop their 
administrative and technical expertise when deciding preemption matters by 
collecting and considering additional data. 
Together, Mendelson‘s and Sharkey‘s scholarship details how agencies 
have failed to develop and use their expertise in agency-preemption matters, 
suggests that Skidmore deference is appropriate in light of an agency‘s lack 
of preemption expertise, and indicates that an agency‘s inexpert status need 
not be static.  Although Sharkey focuses on how agencies can improve their 
preemption decision making, we can rely on her insights to consider how 
Congress has improved (and can further improve) administrative expertise 
in preemption. 
To be sure, as Miriam Seifter‘s valuable contribution to this symposium 
argues, applying Skidmore to preemption or federalism questions will 
render Chevron‘s ―Step Zero‖—the step at which courts determine whether 
Chevron‘s two-step regime applies—more complex and less certain by 
excluding a certain kind of agency interpretation from Chevron deference.64  
But because Chevron is premised primarily on notions of congressional 
intent and delegation,65 one must subjugate concerns over complexity and 
certainty to those of congressional intent.  Congressional intent as to 
delegation is often far from simple and consistent as a general matter.66  
But, in the preemption context, there is good reason to think that Congress 
does not intend to delegate interpretive primacy to agencies over 
preemption matters, and therefore the certainty issues in the preemption 
context are not as worrisome as may exist elsewhere.  Abbe Gluck and Lisa 
Bressman‘s pathbreaking survey of congressional drafters concerning 
various administrative law doctrines found that most of the surveyed 
drafters asserted that agency preemption of state law is a major policy 
question that Congress does not delegate to agencies.67  Likewise, as Chris 
 
 61. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L. REV. 521 
(2012). 
 62. See id. at 572, 578–79. 
 63. See id. at 582–90. 
 64. See Miriam Seifter, Federalism at Step Zero, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 633, 636–37 
(2014). 
 65. See supra Part I.A. 
 66. See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. 
CT. REV. 201, 223 (2001) (―Congress‘s view on deference (were Congress to consider the 
matter) likely would hinge on numerous case-specific and agency-specific variables . . . .‖). 
 67. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons:  Part I, 65 
STAN. L. REV. 901, 1004 (2013) (―But of note, 55% of our respondents equated preemption 
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Walker‘s contribution to this symposium indicates, surveyed agency rule 
drafters mostly thought that Congress does not signal delegation of 
preemption questions to agencies through statutory ambiguity (and thus 
intend Chevron deference to apply).68  These findings concerning intent 
suggest that applying Skidmore to preemption questions is consistent with 
congressional intent and thus existing deference doctrines. 
II.   CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO OCC PREEMPTION 
The OCC‘s preemption of state consumer-protection laws provides 
perhaps the most striking example of inexpertness, preemption, and a 
congressional response.  The OCC‘s critics charged that the OCC‘s 
preemption decisions were driven not by expertise but by the OCC‘s 
attempt to aggrandize its own power.  Through Dodd-Frank, Congress 
sought to improve the OCC‘s agency-preemption expertise in several ways, 
including by limiting judicial deference to the OCC with Chevmore 
codification.  That codification, among other things, can further improve 
agency expertise in future legislation. 
A.   OCC Preemption Before Dodd-Frank 
The OCC, an independent agency within the U.S. Treasury 
Department,69 administers the National Bank Act70 (NBA) and provides 
federal banking charters.71  The Supreme Court held in Barnett Bank of 
Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson72 that the NBA preempts state laws that 
―stan[d] as an obstacle‖ to federal objectives, such as empowering federal 
banks and ensuring their safety and soundness.73  In later decisions, the 
Supreme Court added that the NBA preempts state laws that ―significantly 
burden,‖74 ―interfere with,‖75 or ―impair[] or impede[]‖76 it.77 
In response to Barnett Bank, the OCC engaged in numerous preemption 
activities.  Before 2004, it issued numerous preemption legal opinions and 
 
questions with major policy questions, in the sense that they viewed those as not for agencies 
to resolve.‖). 
 68. See Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Inside the Regulatory State:  An Empirical 
Assessment, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 721 (2014) (―Finally, regarding preemption of state 
law, fewer than half (46 percent) agreed that Congress intends to delegate preemption 
questions by ambiguity.‖). 
 69. 12 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2012) (listing the OCC as an 
―independent regulatory agency‖).  Although independent agencies are typically defined as 
those whose heads the President cannot remove at will, Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, 
Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 
772 (2013), the President can remove the Comptroller at will, see 12 U.S.C. § 2. 
 70. 12 U.S.C. § 38. 
 71. See 12 C.F.R. § 4.2 (2011). 
 72. 517 U.S. 25 (1996). 
 73. Id. at 31 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 74. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 13 (2007). 
 75. Id. at 12. 
 76. Id. at 21. 
 77. The NBA does not permit field preemption. See Aguayo v. U.S. Bank, 653 F.3d 912, 
921 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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interpretive letters concerning national banks.78  But its actions did not 
receive widespread attention until 2003 when the OCC preempted many 
provisions of the Georgia Fair Lending Act,79 which sought to prevent 
common predatory mortgage-lending practices.80  The OCC contended that 
it had little evidence that national banks were engaged in predatory 
practices and, at any rate, many of the same prohibitions existed under 
federal regulations.81  Consumer advocates responded that the OCC had 
prevented the states—twenty-eight of which had adopted predatory-lending 
prohibitions82—from protecting their citizens, and they saw the OCC‘s sole 
concern as banks‘ safety and soundness as opposed to consumer 
protection.83  At about the same time, the OCC promulgated an expansive 
rule that preempted state laws that ―obstruct, impair, or condition a national 
bank‘s ability to fully exercise its Federally authorized powers‖ in lending, 
taking deposits, and other ―operations.‖84  In response, Congress conducted 
hearings to determine whether the OCC had acted contrary to congressional 
intent85 and whether the regulation‘s preemption—especially with the 
―condition‖ concept—was broader than the Barnett Bank standard.86  
Ultimately, the Supreme Court expressed its lack of confidence in the OCC 
when it rejected the OCC‘s preemption of state visitorial powers over 
national banks.87 
Three considerations suggest that the OCC‘s preemption decisions were 
not products of agency expertise.  First, the OCC has a conflict of interest in 
 
 78. See Raymond Natter & Katie Wechsler, Dodd-Frank Act and National Bank 
Preemption:  Much Ado About Nothing, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 301, 318–20 (2012) 
(identifying preemption concerning banking branches, offices, ATM locations, loan 
products, and fees). 
 79. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-1 (2012). 
 80. See Natter & Wechsler, supra note 78, at 320. 
 81. See id.; Christopher L. Peterson, Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, and Predatory 
Lending by Banking Agents:  Are Federal Regulators Biting Off More Than They Can 
Chew?, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 515, 526–27 (2007). 
 82. See Natter & Wechsler, supra note 78, at 324. 
 83. See, e.g., Brief of AARP et al. As Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 11–12, 
Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559 (No. 05–1342), 2006 WL 2570989, at 
*11; Amanda Quester & Kathleen Keest, Looking Ahead After Watters v. Wachovia Bank:  
Challenges for Lower Courts, Congress, and the Comptroller of the Currency, 27 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 187, 195 (2007); Nicholas Bagley, Note, The Unwarranted Regulatory 
Preemption of Predatory Lending Laws, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2274, 2304 (2004).  For its part, 
the OCC denies that it has ignored consumer protection. See Mark E. Budnitz, The 
Federalization and Privatization of Public Consumer Protection Law in the United States:  
Their Effect on Litigation and Enforcement, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 663, 673 n.50 (2008). 
 84. See Sharkey, supra note 61, at 553–54 (quoting Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Cuomo v. 
Clearing House:  The Supreme Court Responds to the Subprime Financial Crisis and 
Delivers a Major Victory for the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, in THE 
PANIC OF 2008:  CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM 305 (Lawrence E. 
Mitchell & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. eds., 2010)). 
 85. See id. 
 86. See Natter & Wechsler, supra note 78, at 322; see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The 
Dodd-Frank Act’s Expansion of State Authority to Protect Consumers of Financial Services, 
36 J. CORP. L. 893, 936 (2011). 
 87. See Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass‘n, LLC, 557 U.S. 519, 535–36 (2009). See 
generally Wilmarth, supra note 84. 
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preempting state law.88  Former Comptroller John Hawke, Jr., 
acknowledged that the OCC used agency preemption to attract chartering 
entities (from competitors such as the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) 
and state agencies).89  Attracting and retaining banking entities is important 
to the OCC because it receives almost all of its funding from chartered 
entities, not taxpayers.90  Second, regulated parties reputedly have captured 
the OCC and have used it to limit their liability under various state laws.91  
Regulatory capture undermines expert decision making because the agency 
becomes persistently biased in favor of the captor (usually the regulated 
industry).92  Indeed, the conflicted and captured OCC appeared to focus on 
preemption as a ―tool for conducting nationwide business,‖93 ignoring data 
and other values that are germane to preemption, such as corrective 
justice,94 regulatory efficiency,95 and states‘ authority, dignity, and policy 
experimentation.96  For example, the OCC‘s revision to its 2004 Visitorial 
Powers Rule and notice of proposed rulemaking contained ―no factual 
findings . . . explaining why preemption was necessary in the specific case 
or what conflicts between state authorities and federal banks justified 
preemption.‖97  Likewise, the OCC‘s lengthy explanation in preempting 
Georgia‘s Fair Lending Act failed to engage in any significant discussion of 
federalism values.98  Third, the OCC‘s process for preemption rulemaking 
may not provide adequate assurances that agency expertise influences 
federalism questions.  OCC preemption rulings are generally no different 
than other rulemakings, have internal guidelines that are ―a bit out of date,‖ 
and rely upon mere ―informal[]‖ agency supervision.99  The Government 
Accountability Office found that the OCC inadequately consulted with 
 
 88. See Mendelson, supra note 53, at 722 (noting that agency self-interest can impede 
agency‘s consideration of states‘ interest); accord Mendelson, supra note 12, at 794–95. 
 89. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 16 (2010); accord Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC’s 
Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual 
Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 232 
(2004); see also Mendelson, supra note 53, at 715 (noting that strong obstacle preemption 
prevents state competition).  Indeed, U.S. Bancorp CEO Richard Davis stated that the OCC‘s 
preemption power was the banking industry‘s ―number one concern‖ with Dodd-Frank. See 
Chris Serres, Bill Has Banks Fearing Power of the States, STAR TRIBUNE (Mar. 16, 2010, 
11:35 PM), http://www.startribune.com/business/87956447.html. 
 90. See Wilmarth, supra note 89, at 232. 
 91. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1, 27 (2011) (referring to amici briefs in Cuomo, 557 U.S. 519). 
 92. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies:  Avoiding Capture Through Institutional 
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 21–22 (2010). 
 93. See Sharkey, supra note 61, at 555 (quoting OCC officials). 
 94. See Jamelle C. Sharpe, Legislating Preemption, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 163, 227–
28 (2011). 
 95. See id. 
 96. Mendelson, supra note 12, at 781–82. 
 97. Sharkey, supra note 61, at 581.  The OCC had engaged in some factual discussion 
concerning whether depository institutions engaged in predatory lending when preempting 
Georgia‘s Fair Lending Act. See OCC, Preemption Determination & Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 
46,264, 46,271–72 (Aug. 5, 2003). 
 98. See generally OCC, Preemption Determination & Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,264 (Aug. 
5, 2003). 
 99. Sharkey, supra note 61, at 576–77 (quoting OCC officials). 
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affected groups (such as states and consumer advocates), failed to document 
these consultations,100 and failed to provide sufficiently detailed internal 
guidance for preemption rulemaking.101 
B.   Encouraging Agency-Preemption Expertise 
In response to the OCC‘s flawed preemption rulings,102 Dodd-Frank 
sought to address state-law preemption standards that govern national banks 
and their subsidiaries in 12 U.S.C. § 25b.  Despite the Obama 
Administration‘s call to abolish the OCC‘s preemption authority,103 
Congress took a more modest, yet pathbreaking, approach to encourage 
better agency preemption.  Dodd-Frank provides a preemption standard, 
judicial review standards, and various procedures for the OCC to follow 
when seeking to preempt certain state consumer-protection laws. 
1.   Dodd-Frank and Chevmore Codification 
The relevant preemption provisions apply primarily to ―state consumer 
financial laws.‖104  Those laws directly regulate consumer financial 
transactions and do not discriminate against national banks.105  Dodd-Frank 
preempts them only if, among other reasons, they ―prevent[] or significantly 
interfere[] with the exercise by the national bank of its powers‖ in accord 
―with the legal standard for preemption in . . . Barnett Bank.‖106 
The Act contains several procedural requirements for agency preemption.  
The preemption determination may be made by a court or ―by regulation or 
order of the [Comptroller107] on a case-by-case basis.‖108  ―Case-by-case 
basis‖ refers to the OCC‘s ―determination . . . concerning the impact of a 
particular State consumer financial law on any national bank . . . or the law 
of any other State with substantively equivalent terms.‖109  The Comptroller 
must consult with and consider the views of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB).110  ―Substantial evidence, made on the record of 
 
 100. Id. at 582–83. 
 101. See id. at 576. 
 102. See, e.g., James A. Huizinga et al., OCC Moves to Implement Dodd-Frank Act 
Preemption Provisions, 128 BANKING L.J. 755, 758 (2011) (referring to letters to the OCC 
from Rep. Barney Frank, Sen. Mark Warner, and Sen. Tom Carper expressing concerns 
about the OCC‘s preemption rulings). 
 103. See Natter & Wechsler, supra note 78, at 341 n.231 (referring to U.S. DEP‘T OF THE 
TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM:  A NEW FOUNDATION 61 (2009) and H.R. 
3126, 111th Cong. § 143 (2009)). 
 104. See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b) (2012). 
 105. See id. § 25b(a)(2). 
 106. Id. § 25b(b)(1)(B). 
 107. Section 25b(b)(6) provides that ―[a]ny regulation, order, or determination made by 
the Comptroller . . . under paragraph (1)(B) shall be made by the Comptroller, and shall not 
be delegable . . . .‖ 
 108. Id. § 25b(b)(1)(B).  The rule or order must be made ―in accordance with applicable 
law,‖ presumably including the APA. See id. 
 109. Id. § 25b(b)(3)(A). 
 110. See id. § 25b(b)(3)(B). 
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the proceeding,‖ must support the regulation or order.111  Every five years 
thereafter, the OCC must reconsider—through notice-and-comment 
proceedings—whether preemption is still necessary and report to 
Congress.112  The OCC must also publish at least quarterly a list of 
preemption determinations and identify affected activities and practices.113 
When reviewing the OCC‘s preemption determinations, Congress 
commanded courts to apply the four Skidmore factors.114  A savings clause 
clarifies that the codified Skidmore standard for preemption rulings, 
however, does not apply to other OCC interpretations of the NBA.115  The 
codification of the Chevmore doctrines appears intentional because the 
House, before sending its bill to the Senate, revised the original bill from 
providing no deference for preemption determinations116 to providing 
Skidmore deference117 and rejected an amendment that would have likely 
allowed Chevron to apply.118  The relevant Senate Committee Report 
described concerns regarding the OCC‘s conflict of interest in using 
preemption as a tool for fee generation119 and noted that Chevron deference 
would no longer apply to the OCC‘s preemption decisions.120 
2.   How Congress Focused on Expertise 
Congress‘s handiwork in § 25b may be best understood as attempting to 
develop and encourage the OCC‘s use of technical and administrative 
expertise in agency preemption.  I consider below five key ways in which 
Congress did so, including by codifying Skidmore. 
First, Congress requires the OCC to support its preemption rulings with 
data.  The OCC must develop a factual record because it must have 
―substantial evidence, made on the record of the proceeding.‖  The use of 
 
 111. See id. § 25b(c). 
 112. See id. § 25b(d)(1)–(2). 
 113. See id. § 25b(g). 
 114. More specifically, Skidmore deference extends to ―any determinations made by the 
Comptroller regarding preemption of a State law by title 62 of the Revised Statutes or [12 
U.S.C. § 371],‖ not merely state consumer financial laws. Id. § 25b(b)(5)(A) (emphasis 
added). 
 115. See id. § 25b(5)(B). 
 116. See H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 5136C(b)(4) (as reported by H. Comm. on Financial 
Services, 1st Sess., 2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr4173ih/ 
pdf/BILLS-111hr4173ih.pdf. 
 117. See H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 5136C(b)(5)(A) (as passed by House, 1st Sess., 2009), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr4173ih/pdf/BILLS-
111hr4173ih.pdf. 
 118. See 155 CONG. REC. E3029 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 2009) (statement of Rep. Melissa 
Bean) (―[W]hen a court is reviewing an OCC determination concerning the proper 
interpretation of the [NBA] or other Federal law that the OCC is charged with administering, 
the court is to apply the traditional deference accorded to an agency, often referred to as 
‗Chevron‘ deference.‖).  Representative Bean‘s manager‘s amendment had no specific 
provision for deference to agency preemption. See Amend. No. 141 to H.R. 4173 (Dec. 9, 
2009) (Offered by Rep. Bean of Ill.). 
 119. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 16 (2010). 
 120. See id. at 176. 
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the Administrative Procedure Act‘s121 (APA) ―substantial evidence‖ 
standard (as opposed to its arbitrary and capricious standard, which would 
normally apply to informal proceedings) is telling because ―substantial 
evidence‖ primarily focuses on factual findings and their implications, as 
opposed to discretionary policy judgments,122 and constitutes ―a 
considerably more generous judicial review‖ standard.123  Indeed, OCC 
officials after Dodd-Frank are ―aware that proffering evidence in support of 
preemption enhances the likelihood that a court will adopt its preemption 
conclusions.‖124 
Relatedly, Congress requires that parties have the ability to participate in 
perhaps extremely formalized proceedings.  The OCC must place its 
substantial evidence ―on the record‖ after some kind of administrative 
proceeding, indicating that the OCC must provide interested parties an 
opportunity to respond to the Agency‘s position and provide supporting or 
contrary comments and evidence that expand the administrative record.  
Because these opportunities generally arise in (but are not limited to) formal 
adjudication and formal and informal substantive rulemakings,125 the 
OCC‘s ability to promulgate guidance documents, opinion letters, or other 
forms of informal or interagency decision making appears significantly 
constrained, if not prohibited, for preemption rulings.  Indeed, Congress‘s 
use of the ―on the record‖ language (which triggers formal proceedings 
under the APA), along with its reference to the ―substantial evidence‖ 
standard that only applies to formal proceedings under the APA, strongly 
suggests that the OCC must preempt through formal adjudication or formal 
rulemaking under the APA.126 
Second, to promote robust debate and data collection and to counter 
regulatory capture concerns, Congress has encouraged the CFPB‘s 
participation.127  The Comptroller‘s obligation to consult the CFPB and 
 
 121. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
 122. See Levin, supra note 36, at 253–55, 273–76 (contrasting review of policy 
judgments under arbitrary and capricious standard with review of factual findings under 
substantial evidence standard). 
 123. See Abbott Labs., Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 143 (1967); Stephanie R. Hoffer & 
Christopher J. Walker, The Death of Tax Court Exceptionalism, 99 MINN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 20 n.138) (citing Am. Paper Inst. v. Am. Elec. Power 
Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 412 n.7 (1983)), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2458248_code649541.pdf?abstractid=23
93412&mirid=1 (describing arbitrary and capricious review as ―more lenient‖ to the agency 
than substantial evidence review). 
 124. Sharkey, supra note 61, at 582. 
 125. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 554, 556, 557 (2012); Wilmarth, supra note 86, at 931 (―[T]he 
OCC may not make any preemption determination by issuing an opinion letter, court brief or 
informal guidance.‖). 
 126. Sections 553 and 554 of the APA require formal proceedings when Congress calls 
for agency action ―on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.‖  The directive in 
Dodd-Frank calls for findings ―on the record of the proceeding.‖  Because the Court has 
strictly interpreted the APA triggering language, it is not certain that Congress has required 
the OCC to proceed through formal proceedings.  But if so, it is likely one of the first 
instances in which Congress has required formal rulemaking in decades. 
 127. See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(3)(B) (2012). 
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consider its views renders it more likely that the OCC has the input of an 
agency focused on consumer protection, as opposed to national banks‘ 
safety.128  The CFPB may be able to provide (or alert consumer-protection 
advocates to provide) the OCC with additional germane data to influence 
the OCC‘s preemption decision.129  More cynically, the CFPB‘s presence 
(and ability to alert Congress) may also help focus the Agency on the 
administrative record (and thus render it more likely that the OCC will use 
its expertise) by helping temper the significant bias and interest-group 
capture concerns that undermine expert decision making.130 
Third, Congress requires the OCC to revisit its earlier preemption 
decisions at least every five years (and consider their implications 
quarterly).131  These reevaluations require the Agency, after notice and 
comment, to determine whether new data or experience undermines the 
original preemption determination.  Likewise, the OCC‘s duty to report its 
periodic evaluations to Congress ensures that Congress—and courts with 
Skidmore deference in hand—can oversee whether current data informs the 
OCC‘s determination.132 
Fourth, Congress has sought to focus and limit the Comptroller‘s 
preemption inquiry.  The Comptroller herself133 must apply the codified 
preemption standard via rule or order on a case-by-case basis to ensure that 
she considers the implications of a particular law.134  By narrowing the 
Comptroller‘s inquiry and providing procedural requirements for that 
inquiry, Congress has rendered it more likely that instead of implementing 
broad preemption policies, the Comptroller can develop and identify data to 
inform whether the specific state law significantly interferes with national 
banks‘ powers. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Congress‘s Skidmore codification 
incentivizes agencies to develop and rely upon their technical and 
administrative expertise when engaging in agency preemption.  Courts, as 
discussed in Part I, defer under Skidmore only to the extent that the agency 
 
 128. See id. 
 129. See Barkow, supra note 92, at 52 (―Consultation may bring more experts into the 
process and improve decision making by presenting competing viewpoints.‖). 
 130. See id. at 21–22 (discussing how capture impedes expert decision making); id. at 62 
(noting that interagency lobbying can neutralize interest-group influence). 
 131. See § 25b(d)(1)–(2). 
 132. These review-and-report provisions also increase the burden of agency preemption, 
incentivizing the OCC to limit preemption rulings. 
 133. The Comptroller‘s inability to delegate ensures that he or she retains full political 
accountability for preemption decisions. 
 134. The substantive preemption standard presents interpretive difficulties. Compare 
Natter & Wechsler, supra note 78, at 337–48 (arguing that Dodd-Frank did not materially 
alter Barnett Bank or prior OCC standard), with Wilmarth, supra note 86, at 925 (arguing 
that ―Dodd-Frank establishes new preemption standards under the NBA‖), and Jared Elosta, 
Dynamic Federalism and Consumer Financial Protection:  How the Dodd-Frank Act 
Changes the Preemption Debate, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1273, 1299 (2011) (―[Dodd–Frank‘s] 
language is notably different from the OCC‘s 2004 [preemption] rule . . . .‖).  However, 
Congress has at least provided some substantive guidance to the OCC and aligned that 
guidance with matters within the agency‘s ken. See Mendelson, supra note 53, at 721–22 
(noting that Congress rarely provides agencies clear guidance on preemption). 
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employs expertise because they look for determinations that ―constitute a 
body of experience and informed judgment.‖135  In short, without 
developing and relying upon expertise supported by an administrative 
record, the agency is entitled to no deference at all. 
3.   Why the OCC Was Not Ready for Chevron Deference 
Awarding the OCC Chevron deference would likely have been premature 
for two reasons.  First, conflict-of-interest and capture concerns continue to 
surround the OCC, giving the OCC incentive to mask improper purposes as 
―expertise.‖  To be sure, Congress ensured some balance to OCC 
preemption decision making by requiring the OCC to consult the CFPB.  
And Congress likely reduced the OCC‘s conflict of interest by abolishing 
another charter-granting federal agency (the OTS).136  But the OCC still 
may view preemption as a fee-generating device because the OCC 
continues to collect fees from chartered institutions,137 which can otherwise 
obtain cheaper state charters.138  Moreover, regulated parties appear to have 
significant sway over the OCC after Dodd-Frank because immediately 
before the effective date of certain Dodd-Frank provisions, the OCC largely 
reaffirmed its preemption determinations without satisfying the procedural 
requirements in § 25b.139  The OCC concluded (with almost no 
explanation) that by acting before that effective date, it did not need to 
comply with § 25b at all.140  Scholars and courts challenged its action as 
―flouting‖ those requirements.141  These lingering structural concerns and 
recent actions suggest that Congress and courts should be skeptical of OCC 
preemption decisions that purport to be products of agency expertise and 
thereby support Congress‘s choice to remove the OCC‘s preemption 
decisions from Chevron‘s warm embrace. 
Second, Dodd-Frank does not require the OCC to consider federalism 
values, limiting its ability to develop experience in considering how these 
values should influence the Agency‘s reliance on technical and 
 
 135. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
 136. See Wilmarth, supra note 86, at 896. 
 137. See OCC, http://www.occ.gov/about/what-we-do/mission/index-about.html (last 
visited on Oct. 19, 2014) (―[T]he OCC‘s operations are funded primarily by assessments on 
national banks and federal savings associations.‖). 
 138. Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Recent Challenges to the Persistent Dual Banking 
System, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 263, 273 (1996); accord Christine E. Blair & Rose M. 
Kushmeider, Challenges to the Dual Banking System:  The Funding of Bank Supervision, 
FDIC BANKING REV., Mar. 2006, at 6 (―[T]he assessments for supervision paid by state-
chartered banks are significantly less than those paid by comparably sized OCC-supervised 
banks.‖); see also Mendelson, supra note 53, at 715 (noting that strong obstacle preemption 
prevents state competition). 
 139. See Arthur Wilmarth, OCC Gets It Wrong on Preemption, Again, AM. BANKER (Jul. 
28, 2011, 4:34 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/OCC-preemption-Dodd–
Frank-1040692-1.html. 
 140. See Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 
Fed. Reg. 43,549, 43,557 (July 21, 2011). 
 141. See Wilmarth, supra note 139 (stating the OCC‘s 2004 preemption rules ―fl[y] in the 
face of Dodd-Frank‖).  A federal district court has agreed. See Sacco v. Bank of Am., No. 
5:12-cv-00006-RLV-DCK, 2012 WL 6566681, at *8 n.7 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 17, 2012). 
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administrative expertise in preemption matters.  Because Dodd-Frank 
turned the OCC into an independent agency,142 the OCC no longer must 
comply with the Federalism Executive Order‘s directive to consider 
federalism values or consult with states.143  This omission limits the extent 
of the OCC‘s inquiry and possibly the input from significantly interested 
parties.  In short, aside from its historical lack of expertise-driven 
determinations, the OCC‘s continuing conflict of interest, its apparent 
regulatory capture, and its myopic preemption inquiry all suggest that 
Chevron deference was not—at least yet—suitable. 
C.   Improving Expertise in Agency Preemption 
Going forward, Congress can improve an agency‘s use of expertise as to 
preemption specifically and other matters generally.  Congress can lead 
agencies to consider how their technical and administrative expertise 
interacts with federalism values by requiring agencies to consider those 
values and consult with affected parties.  Congress can also improve 
agencies‘ use of administrative and technical expertise both inside and 
outside of the preemption context by using Chevron deference as a ―carrot‖ 
for agencies to develop and apply their expertise. 
In the agency-preemption context, Congress should expand the kind of 
expertise that agencies have in preemption matters.  Congress can do so by 
requiring agencies to consider how federalism values interact with the 
agencies‘ understanding of state laws‘ impact on industry and the federal 
statutory scheme.144  These federalism values, found in the well-received 
Federalism Executive Order,145 include using preemption only for issues of 
truly national scope, considering the states‘ and the people‘s rights to 
determine the ―moral, political, and legal character of their lives,‖ treating 
the states as policy laboratories, and acting with ―the greatest caution‖ when 
federal action affects the states‘ or localities‘ policymaking discretion.146  
Codifying these considerations (which are unlikely to be part of agencies‘ 
daily missions) ensures that they are part of the preemption calculus and 
encourages agencies to gain experience in applying their day-to-day 
expertise to broader inter-sovereign structural values. 
Codifying federalism values will give agencies statutory impetus for 
collecting quantitative and qualitative information from states concerning 
these values.  The federalism values, after all, generally fall on the ―costs‖ 
side of a preemption cost-benefit ledger, even if they may often be 
qualitative in nature, because federal preemption limits the benefits that 
 
 142. See Sharkey, supra note 61, at 555–56.  The OCC is listed as an ―independent 
regulatory agency,‖ 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2012), but the Comptroller of the Currency is still 
subject to the President‘s at-will removal, 12 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 143. See Exec. Order No. 13,132, § 9, 3 C.F.R. 206 (1999); Sharkey, supra note 61, at 
555–56. 
 144. See Mendelson, supra note 12, at 789–90. 
 145. See Sharkey, supra note 61, at 526–27 (―There appears to be consensus that the 
requirements of the preemption provisions of E.O. 13132—including consultation with the 
states and ‗federalism impact statements‘—are sound.‖). 
 146. Exec. Order No. 13,132, § 2(a)–(i), 3 C.F.R. 206 (1999). 
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federalism is thought to provide.  Agencies can seek information from 
states on, for instance, how a proposed preemptive regulation would likely 
affect autonomy interests, whether the states have invested money in state-
level regulatory regimes that would evidence states‘ interest in the field, and 
whether states are engaged in innovative or uniform policymaking.  After 
receiving evidence, the agency can rely upon its administrative and 
technical expertise—whether from the agency‘s administration of a 
regulatory program or from its staffers‘ work in the private sector—to 
evaluate the information and better understand a preempting regulation‘s 
effect on state interests.  By prompting agencies to receive data on 
federalism values and consider them as part of the decision-making process, 
agencies can improve their preemption expertise while Congress and courts 
acknowledge that ―questions about the appropriate federal-state balance are 
not easily separated from substantive policy determinations on which 
agencies do have expertise‖ concerning specific regulatory schemes.147 
Likewise, Congress should also require consultation with states or state-
government groups as mandated under the Federalism Executive Order.148  
Indeed, Congress has done so in other contexts.149  Additional stakeholders‘ 
participation in preemption decision making not only encourages inter-
sovereign dialogue (to validate the states‘ dignity interests) but also 
provides a way for the agency to obtain (or confront) additional information 
and empirical data that even consumer advocates may not have.  Such 
consultation can improve all facets of agency expertise by broadening the 
discussion to include federalism values with affected sovereigns and 
obtaining the states‘ regulatory data. 
More broadly, both inside and outside the preemption context, Congress 
can use Chevmore codification to encourage agencies to engage in public 
participation that can lead to a robust exchange of ideas and data.  Aside 
from requiring an agency to use particular regulatory procedures, Congress 
could provide that the use of certain procedures entitles the agency to 
Chevron deference.  By doing so, Congress could indicate its preference for 
procedures that encourage public participation, full administrative records, 
the collection and use of data, and expert determinations.  As yet another 
option, to help give agencies time to develop and demonstrate their ability 
to rely upon their expertise, Congress could clarify that Skidmore deference 
applies until a certain contingency occurs, at which time Chevron deference 
would apply.  The contingency could be the promulgation of a certain 
number of preemption orders or rules, the promulgation of a certain number 
of rulings that have received the courts‘ approval under Skidmore, or a 
certain time period (say, after five years of preemption rulings).  By using 
 
 147. Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law As the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023, 
2080–82 (2008) (discussing the interrelationship between importance of state dignity 
interests and policy considerations). 
 148. See Sharkey, supra note 61, at 584–86 (recommending that agencies prepare 
guidance documents for outreach to affected groups and state representatives). 
 149. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 5125(b)(2) (2012) (regarding preemption decisions concerning 
hazardous materials by the Secretary of Homeland Security). 
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Skidmore as a stick and Chevron as a carrot, Congress can encourage 
agencies to develop and use their expertise, especially for regulatory 
matters in which additional values outside of the regulatory scheme are 
important. 
This is true even if agencies generally think that Skidmore deference 
applies to preemption decisions. Chris Walker asserts that Chevmore 
codification may have limited effect on agencies because, according to the 
agency personnel that he surveyed, they think that Skidmore and a 
presumption against preemption apply to their preemption decisions.150  But 
these assumptions only show the value of using Chevron as a carrot.  
Having a trigger for Chevron deference that depends on increased agency 
expertise not only clarifies Congress‘s intent to delegate (and perhaps to 
abrogate the presumption against preemption under certain statutory 
schemes), but it also provides the agency incentive to improve its 
preemption expertise to obtain more judicial deference.  To be sure, the 
codification of Skidmore deference for an agency that already thinks that 
Skidmore applies would have minimal effect.  But my proposal goes further 
and suggests that both Skidmore and Chevron can be used together to 
influence agency behavior. 
CONCLUSION 
Chevmore serves as more than a doctrine for courts to invoke when 
overseeing the federal administrative state.  It has become, instead, a 
congressional tool to help resolve concerns over agency preemption and 
judicial review thereof.  And more broadly, Congress can use Chevmore 
codification to reveal its intent as to which values, such as expertise, should 
inform appropriate judicial deference to agency action going forward—
especially in the context of agency preemption.  In other words, Chevmore, 
during the next thirty years, has an innovative new role to play. 
 
 150. See Walker, supra note 68, at 721. 
